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Dominique M. Hanssens****THE IMPACT OF ACQUISITION CHANNELS ON CUSTOMER EQUITY
Abstract
Customer equity (CE henceforth) is a powerful new paradigm to evaluate the firm’s
value  and to  optimally  allocate  marketing  resources.  This  paper  is  focused  on  the
relationship between customer acquisition and CE. We attempt to answer the following four
questions:  1)  How  should  customer  acquisition  channels  be  categorized  to  make  them
meaningful to managers and academics?; 2) How do we measure the effects of different
acquisition channels on the firm’s performance?; 3) How do we disentangle short-run effect
and long-run effects?; and 4) How should the manager allocate a limited budget among the
acquisition channels so as to maximize customer equity?
We first propose a way of categorizing customer acquisition channels according to
their  level  of  contact  and  intrusiveness.  A  vector-autoregressive  (VAR)  model  is  used
to examine  the  dynamics  of  acquisition  channels  and  the  firm’s  performance,  and  an
empirical illustration on a surviving Internet company will be provided. The results show that
each cohort (i.e., customers from different acquisition channels) has different short-run and
long-run effects on the firm’s performance by the subsequent login and purchasing behavior.
Building  on  previous  research  on  optimal  resource  allocation,  we  develop  a
Marketing  Decision  Support  System  (MDSS)  to  help  managers  allocate  the  acquisition
budget  among  different  channels  with  the  objective  of  maximizing  customer  equity.  We
illustrate the consequences of naively maximizing the short-term profit and not accounting
for differences in the margin contribution of different cohorts.
Keywords: customer equity; customer acquisition; VAR; long-run modelingTHE IMPACT OF ACQUISITION CHANNELS ON CUSTOMER EQUITY
Introduction
Customers are valuable assets for the firm, but they can be costly to acquire and to
retain. Customers’ heterogeneity in the course of their relationship with the firm is reflected
in  their  price  sensitivity,  lifetime  duration,  purchase  volume,  and  even  word-of-mouth
generation.  This  heterogeneity  causes  differences  in  customers’  lifetime  value  (CLV,
hereafter), defined as the discounted stream of cash flows generated over the lifetime of a
customer. To the extent that different acquisition strategies will bring different “qualities” of
customers,  the  acquisition  effort  will  have  an  important  influence  on  the  long-term
profitability of the firm1. Indeed, both practitioners and scholars have emphasized that firms
should not spend to acquire just any customer, but the “right” kind of customer (Reichheld
1993; Blattberg and Deighton 1996; Hansotia and Wang 1997; Blattberg, Getz, and Thomas
2001). Therefore, the customer acquisition process plays an important role in the newly-
emerging paradigm of customer equity (CE)2.
Optimizing the acquisition budget for long-term profitability is particularly relevant
for start-ups and for firms competing in growth markets, where acquisition spending is the
most important expense in the marketing budget. In these scenarios, the firm could have an
illusion  of  profitable  growth,  when  in  fact  it  is  acquiring  unprofitable  customers.  This
occurred for many Internet start-ups that spent aggressively on acquisition in an effort to
maximize  ‘eyeballs’,  with  the  hope  of  locking-in  customer  revenue  later.  For  many
companies, however, that revenue never came, either because their value proposition was not
compelling  enough  or  because  the  underlying  linkage  between  acquisition  spending  and
long-term profitability was poorly understood.
In order to grow their businesses, companies acquire customers using a variety of
channels. In this paper, we define an acquisition channel as any vehicle that initially drives a
prospect to the firm. While broadcast media and direct marketing are the most traditional
acquisition  channels,  firms  also  acquire  customers  through  other  vehicles  such  as  public
1 Moreover, models that do not account for the effect that acquisition has on customer retention will result in
biased estimates (Thomas 2001).
2 For a general discussion of the CE concept, see Blattberg, Getz, and Thomas (2001), and Rust, Zeithaml, and
Lemon (2000).
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these acquisition channels. 
In  a  recent  survey  of  marketing  managers  of  Internet  firms,  it  was  found  that
managers do not predominantly use the channels that they believe are the most effective
(Forrester Research 2001). For example, in this study affiliate programs was said to be a very
effective channel, but it was rarely used. This suggests that managers are unclear about the
effectiveness of different channels of acquisition. For example, online ad banners have been
criticized as ineffective since they drive few click-throughs and exhibit small conversion
rates. However, some authors have warned that media that appear ineffective in the short run
may generate consumer awareness and become effective in the long run (Briggs and Hollis
1997; Drèze and Zufryden 1998). Consequently, acquisition-channel effectiveness should be
measured with models that can quantify short-run as well as long-run response to marketing
stimuli. 
The  distinction  between  short  and  long-run  effects  is  not  new  in  the  marketing
literature, and several statistical models or experiments capable of capturing this distinction
have been proposed3. Nevertheless, managers are often criticized as myopic when making
spending decisions in that they tend to maximize the short-term and neglect the long-term
profitability of the firm. This may occur because the managers’ incentives are linked to short-
term  metrics  such  as  market-share  movements.  On  other  occasions  managers  lack  the
necessary tools to measure the long-run effects of their decisions. The inability to measure
the  future  consequences  of  current  decisions  increases  the  uncertainty  of  future  payoffs,
especially in turbulent markets that are difficult to forecast. By contrast, short-run metrics
such as current market share have a strong credibility at all levels of management and are
easy to justify (Keil, Reibstein, and Wittink 2001). Nonetheless, neglecting the long-term
effects of current actions can lead to suboptimal spending decisions, resulting in inferior
long-run profitability and shareholder value creation (Doyle 2000). 
Hence, there is an urgent need to develop models capable of measuring the long-run
effects of different acquisition strategies, and provide systems to help managers optimally
allocate their acquisition spending among different channels. These models should be able to
disentangle the long-run from the short-run effects, incorporate the risk associated with future
payoffs, and take into account the costs associated with different acquisition channels. This is
the  main  objective  of  the  current  paper.  Moreover,  we  depart  from  “soft”  metrics  of
communication  effectiveness  (e.g.,  brand  awareness)  to  “hard”  metrics  of  profitability
(Greyser and Root 1999), in that we measure the effectiveness of each acquisition channel
with respect to its contribution to the CE of the firm4. Once these long-run effects have been
measured, we can optimally allocate the acquisition budget among the various channels. In
doing so, we do not measure the expected CLV of a customer, but rather her CE contribution.
In this way a customer is worth not only her own expected CLV but also all the indirect
impacts that she has on the firm’s performance over time (e.g., by bringing new customers to
the firm through word-of-mouth).
2
3 For example, streams of research include the use of multivariate time-series techniques (e.g., Dekimpe and
Hanssens  1995a,  1995b,  1999;  Bronnenberg,  Mahajan,  and  Vanhonacker  2000;  Pauwels,  Hanssens,  and
Siddarth  2002;  Nijs  et  al.  2001),  varying-parameters  approaches  (e.g.,  Mela,  Gupta,  and  Lehman  1997;
Jedidi, Mela, and Gupta 1999), and experiments  (e.g., Lodish et al. 1995; Anderson and Simester 2001). For
a  review  of  long-run  marketing  modeling,  see  Dekimpe  and  Hanssens  (2000).  This  paper  fits  into  the
emerging literature of linking marketing spending to long-run shareholder value (e.g., Pauwels et al. 2003).
4 Though there exist various definitions of customer equity (CE), it is defined in this paper as the sum of all
existing and expected customers’ CLVs.  Here CE is used as a metric to show the long-run performance of
the firm.The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  First,  we  categorize  customer  acquisition
channels to investigate their short-run and long-run differences with respect to the impact on
CE. Second, we propose a VAR model to estimate the long-run effect of a customer acquired
from  each  channel  on  the  long-term  performance  of  the  company.  Third,  we  provide  an
empirical illustration using data from an Internet start-up. Lastly, we develop a marketing
decision  support  system  to  help  the  manager  allocate  her  acquisition  budget  among  the
different channels. 
Research Development
Our study differs from previous literature on media selection in at least three ways.
First, we consider important yet under-researched acquisition channels, such as word-of-mouth
and public relations. Second, we study long-run effects of the different acquisition channels on
the  firm’s  performance,  as  separate  from  short-run  effects.  Third,  we  specify  the  long-run
effects  of  acquisition  in  a  customer-equity  framework.  Thus,  our  research  is  particularly
relevant  for  relationship  businesses  in  which  the  firm  spends  aggressively  on  acquiring
customers, in the hope of deriving a substantial future revenue stream. Examples include the
wireless telephone industry, broadband Internet service providers, and cable television.
Classification of Customer Acquisition Channels
Our focus on customer acquisition includes all possible channels that drive new
customers to a firm, including those that are difficult to control, such as word-of-mouth. An
increasing number of firms uses such channels. For instance, BMG Music Service not only
spends on online ad banners and direct mail, but also gives referral incentives (in the form of
free CDs) to existing customers. Netflix, an online DVD rental firm, spends on online ad
banners, places free trial coupons in the DVD-player cartons of some manufacturers, mails
other free-trial coupons to targeted audiences and encourages referrals, although without a
monetary incentive.
Our classification is based on two dimensions used in previous research. The first is
the  acquisition  channel’s  level of contact with  the  prospect,  which  can  be  personal  or
broadcast. For example, if customers learn about the firm from a friend or from an email, the
contact  is  more  personalized  than  if  they  hear  about  it  from  a  TV  advertisement  or  a
newspaper article. Indeed, in the former case someone decided to send a message to that
specific  customer,  while  in  the  latter  the  message  is  available  to  anyone  exposed  to  the
medium. Similar to the concept of audience addressability (Blattberg and Deighton 1991), we
expect personal contacts to have high addressability and broadcast contacts to have lower
addressability5. 
The second dimension is the level of intrusiveness of the acquisition channel, which
can be low or high. Following the persuasion knowledge model (Friestad and Wright 1994,
1995),  we  predict  that  perceived  intrusiveness  has  an  impact  on  customer  response  and
3
5 Audience addressability is defined by Blattberg and Deighton (1991) as the medium’s ability to reach a
defined segment of consumers and minimize exposure to other unwanted audience groups. Note, however
that level of contact and audience addressability are not exactly the same. For example, a TV ad could have
higher audience addressability than a mailing if the TV ad is targeted to a very small and specific consumer
segment using a specialized TV program or channel.subsequent behavior. Indeed, consumers interpret and cope with marketers’ communication
attempts (e.g., advertising) based on contingent persuasion knowledge. They understand that
the main goal of marketing communications is to influence their own beliefs and/or attitudes
about the firm’s products or services. Thus, we argue that visibly commercial acquisition
channels such as direct marketing or mass advertising will be perceived as more intrusive
than channels such as public relations or word-of-mouth6. 
Our classification of acquisition channels based on the level of contact and level of
intrusiveness results in four categories, namely, word-of-mouth (WOM), direct marketing
(DM), advertising (AD), and public relations (PR). A wide array of acquisition tactics can be
assigned to one or other of these categories, and we present some of them as an illustration in
Figure 1. This classification is managerially relevant, as it includes many non-traditional but
widely used acquisition tactics in a comprehensive way. Moreover, it is based on existing
consumer behavior theory and therefore we expect these four categories to differ both in their
short and in their long-run effectiveness7.
Figure 1. Classification of Acquisition Channels
Measuring Acquisition Effectiveness
In  this  research  we  develop  a  metric  that  helps  us  link  acquisition  efforts  to
shareholder value by measuring the impact of the acquisition spending on customer equity,
which has been suggested as a powerful metric for the value of a firm (Gupta, Lehman, and
Stuart 2002). Hence, models capable of maximizing customer equity should help managers
maximize shareholder value. 
4
6 Word-of-mouth communication has been said to be more persuasive than conventional advertising (e.g.,
Herr, Kardes, and Kim 1991; Brown and Reingen 1987). 
7 Nevertheless, the development and testing of formal hypotheses on how level of contact and intrusiveness
affect  short  and  long-run  effectiveness  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  With  our  particular  dataset
(introduced below), we cannot control for personal differences among groups, so we do not know whether
those  differences  are  caused  by  the  nature  of  the  medium,  or  by  individual  characteristics.  We  ran  a
multivariate discriminant analysis of group membership on some personal demographics and found that there
are statistically significant differences in the demographics across groups. Therefore, it can be tentatively
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Personal BroadcastUnlike previous CLV models, our model investigates cross-sectional heterogeneity
at the acquisition channel level8. For example, previous work has assumed that customers are
homogeneous  in  their  expected  future  value  (e.g.,  Blattberg  and  Deighton  1996),  or
longitudinally  heterogeneous  depending  only  on  the  period  of  acquisition  (e.g.,  Gupta,
Lehman,  and  Stuart  2002).  However,  we  expect  different  acquisition  channels  to  yield
customers that are unequal in their contribution to customer equity. This heterogeneity of
acquisition channels has important implications for optimal resource allocation, as firms want
to allocate their limited acquisition budget among the different acquisition channels so that
they maximize their customer equity and therefore shareholder value. We shall emphasize the
differences between the short and the long-run effectiveness to illustrate the importance of
maximizing the latter when allocating marketing resources.
Methodology
Linkage between Acquisition and Long-Run Performance
The acquisition process and its link with the firm’s performance should be examined
as a complex system in which many interactions could take place over time. For example,
when computing the marginal contribution of one new customer to CE, we want to measure
not only her expected CLV but also all the indirect influences that this acquisition will cause
in the firm’s performance.
We propose a vector-autoregressive (VAR) model to investigate these interactions
which we characterize as follows: (1) Direct effects of acquisition on the performance of the
firm. We are interested in measuring the impact on the firm’s performance (e.g., profits) of a
person being acquired from a given acquisition channel; (2) Cross-effects among channels.
For instance, we are interested in how different acquisition channels affect future word-of-
mouth. As an illustration, customers acquired through public relations may generate more
referrals than those acquired from direct marketing; (3) Feedback effects. The firm’s current
performance  may  affect  differently  the  number  of  customers  acquired  through  different
channels in the future. For instance, firms that develop stronger reputations may increase
future customer acquisitions through public relations; (4) Reinforcement effects. Both firm
performance and customer acquisitions will have an effect on each other in the future. For
instance, there may be some inertia in the firm that prompts it to use certain channels more
and others less if it believes some are more effective than others.
For ease of exposition, assume a three-variable system that captures the dynamic
interrelationships  among  the  number  of  customers  acquired  at  time  t through  mass
advertising  (ADt),  the  number  of  customers  acquired  at  time  t through  word-of-mouth
(WOMt), and a proxy variable for the firm’s performance at time t (Vt). The VAR(p) model
would be specified as9,
5
8 We  will  investigate  how  each  acquisition  channel  contributes  to  the  firm’s  customer  equity  and  study
heterogeneity for our four categories of acquisition channels. Our measurement approach could nevertheless
be  used  for  any  particular  acquisition  channel  or  for  any  other  categorization.  There  could  also  be
heterogeneity at different levels, for instance due to demographic characteristics of the individuals attracted
by each channel.
9 A deterministic trend, seasonal dummy variables, and exogenous variables can also be included in this VAR.
Instantaneous effects are not included directly in this VAR, but they are reflected in the variance-covariance
matrix of the residuals (Σ).(1)
For this VAR model of order p, where (e1t, e2t, e3t)’ are white-noise disturbances
following  N (0,  Σ),  the  direct  effects  are  captured  by  a31,  a32,  cross  effects  by  a12,  a21,
feedback effects by a13, a23 and, finally, reinforcement effects by a11, a22, a33. The researcher
could, of course, include additional acquisition channels and even impose restrictions on
some of these parameters if there is an a priori reason for doing so. VAR models can be
heavily parameterized, depending on the number of variables and time lags in the model.
Therefore, long time series are desirable. Note that we do not include marketing activity data
(e.g., advertising expenditures, price promotions) since at this point we are not interested in
measuring how these marketing efforts lead to number of customers acquired. Instead, we
want to measure how much a specific customer contributes to the firm’s performance now
and in the future. The function linking the number of customers acquired to the contribution
to the firm’s customer equity will be called the value generating function. The interactions
between  marketing  spending  and  number  of  acquisitions  is  captured  by  an  acquisition
response function (see Figure 2). We will join these two functions later.
Figure 2. Value Generation through Customer Acquisition
Impulse Response Functions and Customer Equity
Given data availability, a VAR model not only captures all the previous effects (i.e.,
direct, cross, feedback and reinforcement), it also measures the time dynamics of each effect.
We are interested in disentangling the immediate and the long-run effects, and in determining
the total cumulative effects. This is accomplished by Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) that
trace the present and future response of a variable to an unexpected shock in another variable.
VAR models and IRFs have been introduced to the marketing literature in a marketing-mix
context  (e.g.,  Dekimpe  and  Hanssens  1995a,  1995b,  1999;  Bronnenberg,  Mahajan,  and
Vanhonacker 2000; Nijs et al. 2001; Srinivasan, Bass, and Popkowski 2000). They are used
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 channel, impacts customer equity over time. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use
of the VAR method to measure the financial contribution of newly acquired customers.
Assuming  data  stationarity,  we  can  rewrite  the  VAR  model  in  equation (1)  as  a
moving-average representation (see Enders 1995):
(2) 
The coefficients φjk(i) are called impact multipliers and measure the impact of a one-
unit change in εk(t-i) on the jth variable. The different sets of coefficients φjk(i) for i = {0,...,∞}
are  called  impulse  response  functions  and  are  usually  plotted  to  visualize  the  dynamic
behavior  of  the  variables  of  interest  as  a  function  of  shocks  in  other  variables.  We  can
calculate  the  cumulative  long-run  effect  of  unit  impulses  in  any  error  shock  on  another
variable by accumulating the impact multipliers,
(3)
When variables are stationary, the impact multipliers tend to be zero for sufficiently
high numbers of i and therefore the total effect is finite10. 
In  order  to  estimate  the  effect  of  one  new  customer  acquisition  from  a  specific
channel on the long-run performance of the firm we take the following steps: (1) estimate the
impulse response functions defined as the effect of a one-person shock in the acquisition
channel on the firms’ performance (Vt); (2) select the impact multipliers that are significantly
different from zero; and (3) accumulate significant impact multipliers using a discount rate.
Thus, the long-run impact multiplier for a direct effect is obtained as
(4)
where r is the discount rate11, m is the number of periods to include in the calculation, and
φvk(i) is the impact multiplier measuring the response of the V variable to the shock of the kth
variable i time units ago. 
So long as Vt is a good proxy for the contribution of each customer to the firm’s
profits, this impact multiplier can be interpreted as the contribution of one customer acquired
through a specific channel to the firm’s customer equity before accounting for differences in
acquisition costs12. On other occasions, however, Vt may not be expressed in monetary value.
In such cases the impact multiplier needs to be translated to profit contribution, for example,
(5)   λk = τ(γk)
7
Total Effect k j i
i
 (    ( ) →=
=
∞
∑ ) φ jk
0
10 When variables are evolving, the standard procedure is to estimate the VAR model with variables in first
differences. In those cases, the IRFs should be accumulated to measure the impact on level forms.
11 The discount rate should incorporate the risk associated with the specific investment. For example, factors
such as expected future competition or the urgent need to raise money might affect this rate.
12 Note  that  γk does  not  take  into  account  that  a  person  acquired  from  a  given  acquisition  channel,  say
advertising, could be more expensive to acquire than a person acquired through for instance word-of-mouth.
We shall come back to this issue later.
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iwhere τ(γk) is  a  function  that  translates  the  direct  effects  (as  measured  by  the  impact
multipliers) on the firm’s profits. This approach may be necessary, for example, for an online
newspaper  that  generates  revenue  from  advertising  but  can  only  observe  its  users’  login
behavior13.  This  login  behavior  would  presumably  be  highly  correlated  with  advertising
exposure and, therefore, with the firm’s financial performance.
In conclusion, we have developed a metric that is capable of measuring the long-run
CE contribution of a newly acquired customer. This metric captures not only the expected




We study an Internet firm that provided free web hosting to registered users during a
70-week  long  observation  period.  At  the  time  of  registration,  individuals  provided
a demographic  profile  and  responded  to  the  question  “How  did  you  hear  about  our
company?”14, followed by a list of several acquisition channels. Once registered, individuals’
unique behavior was tracked as they logged in to use the firm’s services (e.g., changing the
content or appearance of their web site, or checking on the number of site visits). From these
records, we calculate the weekly total number of unique logins, as well as the number of
registrations  per  acquisition  channel.  These  channels  are  grouped  according  to  the
classification  in  Table  1,  where  we  also  show  some  descriptive  statistics.  A  very  small
number of registrants who indicated “Other” as their acquisition channel was discarded from
this analysis. 
Table 1. Classification of the Acquisition Channels and Descriptive Statistics
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Number of Weekly Acquired Customers
Standard
Series Mean Median Maximum Minimum Deviation
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
AD1 305.56 317.50 550.00 56.00 116.57
DM2 318.99 293.00 953.00 16.00 193.77
PR3 675.01 685.50 1104.00 103.00 216.57
WOM4 850.69 726.00 1746.00 67.00 420.69
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1 AD: Online ad banner; TV, radio, magazine or newspaper advertisement; 2 DM: From an email link; Mailing
to your home or business;  3 PR: Mentioned or linked from other web site; Magazine or newspaper article;
4 WOM: Referral from friends or colleague; Referral from professional organization or association; Referral
from search engine
8
13 This is not necessary if the firm is only interested in finding out which channel is best, assuming that τ(γk) is
the same for all acquisition channels.
14 This  particular  firm  did  not  allow  for  multiple  responses  in  this  question.  Therefore,  we  study  the
predominant channel that brings a customer to the firm.The  number  of  logins  is  a  good  proxy  for  the  firm’s  performance  given  the
characteristics of this business15. Most free-service Internet companies generate advertising
revenue  based  on  logins  or  click-throughs.  Furthermore,  once  a  sufficient  number  of
registrations was achieved, the company switched to a fee-for-service revenue model. As
explained in detail in Appendix A, intensity of login behavior was found to have a positive
and  statistically  significant  correlation  with  customers’  willingness  to  pay.  Therefore,
acquisition channels that yield customers with high usage (login) intensity and therefore a
higher  probability  of  converting  to  a  fee-based  service,  will  be  considered  as  the  most
effective.
The variables are defined as follows: 
ADt:  number of new registrations at time t from mass advertising
DMt:  number of new registrations at time t from direct marketing
PRt:  number of new registrations at time t from public relations
WOMt: number of new registrations at time t from word-of-mouth
Vt:  total number of unique logins at time t
VAR Estimation
The VAR estimation begins with a unit-root test to determine whether the series is
evolving or stationary (see Dekimpe & Hanssens 1995 for a detailed explanation). We use the
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test (e.g., Enders 1995, p. 257), in which the null
hypothesis of unit root corresponds to Ho : ρ = 0 in
(6)
We apply the iterative procedure proposed in Enders (1995, pp. 256-258) to decide
whether to include a deterministic trend in the test. The results are shown in Table 3. All
variables except AD were found to be trend stationary at a 95% confidence level. Since it has
been argued that conventional unit root tests (e.g., ADF) tend to over-accept the null of unit
root, we confirmed our results with the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992), which uses the
null of stationarity16. We found that the two tests disagree for AD and WOM and concluded
that all series seem to be stationary at or near the 95% confidence level. 
9
15 As pointed out in the previous section, our methodology can be implemented with any other proxy variable
for the firm performance.  
16 Note that the null hypothesis of the ADF test is that a series has unit root (i.e., evolutionary).
∆∆ yt y tt i
i
k
   0    1 t-i t    y + =+ ++ −
= ∑ αα ρ β ε 1
1Table 2. Unit Root Test Results
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
ADF (H0: unit root) KPSS (H0: stationary)
Series
Stat 5%-crit Unit root? Stat 5%-crit Unit root?
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
AD -3.00 -3.48 Yes 0.06 0.15 No
DM -5.82 -3.48 No 0.15 0.15 No
PR -3.65 -3.48 No 0.07 0.15 No
WOM -4.14 -3.48 No 0.16 0.15 Yes
V -4.34 -3.48 No 0.08 0.15 No
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
We proceed to estimate the VAR in level form including all performance variables, a
deterministic trend17 t and a dummy variable d,
(7)
The dummy variable is included in order to achieve multivariate normality of the
model  residuals.  This  assumption  will  be  needed  when  deriving  the  generalized  impulse
response  function  (cfr.  infra)  (Koop,  Pesaran,  and  Potter  1996;  Pesaran  and  Shin  1998).
Estimating the model without the dummy variables yields residual outliers in five weeks,
After accounting for these outliers, the MVN assumption is met, following the Lutkepohl test
(1993,  p.155-158).  We  also  test  for  residual  autocorrelation  with  a  portmanteau  test
(Lutkepohl  1993,  p.150-152)  and  find  that  the  null  hypothesis  of  white  noise  cannot  be
rejected. 
We find the optimal lag length to be one, using Schwartz’s Criterion. Although this
VAR model uses 8 parameters per equation, there are sufficient time-series observations (70
weeks) to estimate them. The estimation results are reported in Table 3, and the impulse
response functions are shown in Figure 4. We use generalized impulse response functions
because imposing a temporal ordering of the variables is not credible in our case. These IRFs
are plotted for |t|-statistics exceeding 1, following the procedure in Dekimpe and Hanssens
(1999). 
10
17 The standard practice in VAR modeling is to include a deterministic trend when variables are shown to be
trend stationary. The decision of whether or not to include the trend is, nevertheless, not trivial. In particular,
Sims (1980) and Doan (1992) argue against detrending because that may discard information concerning the
co-movements in the data. We decided to detrend the data, following previous VAR modeling in marketing,
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eTable 3. VAR Model Estimation Results
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
AD DM PR WOM V
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
AD(-1) 0.751 (3.803) -0.270 (-0638) 0.616 (1.773) 0.147 (0.396) 2.878 (1.202)
DM(-1) -0.000 (-0.006) 0.245 (1.518) -0.098 (-0.739) -0.428 (-3.025) -1.133 (-1.241)
PR(-1) 0.095 (0.580) 0.532 (1.510) 0.717 (2.477) 0.403 (1.303) 1.306 (0.655)
WOM(-1) -0.024 (-0.240) -0.354 (-1.647) -0.077 (-0.434) 0.594 (3.146) 0.727 (0.598)
V(-1) -0.014 (-0.625) -0.019 (-0.408) -0.056 (-1.434) -0.039 (-0.937) 0.124 (0.460)
Intercept 53.672 (1.550) 66.083 (0.891) 165.248 (2.711) 61.178 (0.939) 1,021.253 (2.432)
Trend 2.982 (1.052) 10.051 (1.655) 12.278 (2.461) 13.550 (2.540) 139.216 (4.051)
Dummy -27.091 (-0.814) 226.508 (3.179) 37.216 (0.635) -131.915 (-2.108) -301.534 (-0.747)
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
R Squared 0.637 0.395 0.667 0.899 0.953
F Statistic 15.297 5.693 17.432 77.725 178.486
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Results
We interpret the direct, cross and feedback effects of customer acquisition shocks.
These  are  the  most  insightful  managerially,  in  particular  the  direct  effects,  as  they  will
determine the shape of the value generating function.
Direct Effects.  These  IRFs  measure  the  total  or  net  effect  of  an  unexpected
acquisition on the firm’s performance, defined as the total number of logins over time. The
net effect includes not only a new customer’s own login activity, but also the effect on the
login activity of others (e.g., by encouraging friends to use different service features). The
IRFs show that customers acquired through advertising contribute the most to the firm’s
performance.  Using  these  results,  and  assuming  a  discount  rate  r=0  for  simplicity,  we
calculate the long-term multipliers (equation (4)) to be used in our value generating function
as: γAD = 30.51, γDM = 9.22, γPR = 16.58, γWOM = 14.0318. Consistent with our expectation, we
find that each of these multipliers is significantly different from the others at the 5% level,
except for the difference between DM and PR19. 
11
18 We do not make any assumptions on τ(γk) yet, as expressed in equation (5). Therefore, these multipliers
should be interpreted as the contribution to the firm’s total login activity, not to the monetary value of the
firm. 
19 We tested for the differences in the cumulative impulse response function using Monte-Carlo simulations
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sFeedback Effects. Here we investigate how many new customer acquisitions can be
generated  by  an  unexpected  one-login  increase.  Indeed,  increased  usage  of  the  Internet
service may lead to higher customer satisfaction and reliance on the service, which can create
a  diffusion  effect  in  the  form  of  additional  customer  generation.  The  results  show  that
increased login activity has the strongest feedback effect on public relations and word-of-
mouth channels, i.e., as customers become more involved with the service, the firm enjoys
higher  word-of-mouth  generation  and  also  higher  media  coverage.  By  contrast,  the
performance feedback effect is weakest for the direct marketing and advertising channels (see
Figure 4). 
Cross Effects.  We  investigate  only  the  cross  effects  of  the  different  acquisition
channels on the word-of-mouth channel, i.e., how effective the different acquisition channels
are at generating future acquisitions through word-of-mouth. Figure 4 shows that customers
acquired through advertising are better at word-of-mouth generation than those acquired in
other ways. For example, each customer acquired through advertising is expected to bring
around 5.4 new customers, while a customer acquired from direct marketing is expected to
bring only about 0.6 customers. Surprisingly, customers acquired through word-of-mouth are
less  likely  to  generate  referral  customers  than  those  acquired  by  advertising.  These
differences  are  managerially  important  and  require  separate  research  to  determine  their
underlying causes. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis
While  the  VAR  model  and  impulse-response  functions  have  shown  that  the
acquisition channels generate customers of different quality (defined as contribution to CE),
these channels have different acquisition costs as well. Therefore, we conduct a cost-benefit
analysis in Table 6, based on published acquisition costs per channel20. Since this firm did not
offer any referral incentives, we may set the cost of word-of-mouth acquisitions to zero. The
metric “benefit per dollar” measures how many additional logins are generated by one extra
dollar spent on acquiring customers in each channel. For example, while customers from
advertising have the highest impact on customer equity, they are also the most expensive to
acquire. In efficiency terms, advertising is found to be the least cost-effective acquisition
channel.
The acquisition channels also show important efficiency differences when measured
in the short run versus the long run. For example, direct marketing has a benefit per dollar
around  5.2  times  larger  than  that  of  advertising  when  measured  in  the  short  run
(contemporaneous effect), but it is only 3.6 times larger when measured in the long run (total
effect). Thus, managers should investigate the long-run acquisition benefits of each channel,
lest they myopically favor channels with higher short-term performance but lower customer
equity contribution. 
13
20 These costs are the averages of various industries, gathered from an independent research firm (Fiore &
Collins, Successful Affiliate Marketing for Merchants, 2001).Table 4. Cost-Benefit Analysis
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
AD DM PR WOM
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Cost of Acquiring One More Customer ($) 323 27 82 - 
Benefit: Increased Number of Logins
Contemporaneous Effect 9.07 3.98 6.21 5.52
Lagged Effect 21.43 5.24 10.37 8.51
Total Effect 30.51 9.22 16.58 14.03
Benefit per Dollar
Contemporaneous Effect 0.03 0.15 0.08
Lagged Effect 0.07 0.19 0.13
Total Effect 0.09 0.34 0.20
Maximum WOM incentives ($)
Contemporaneous Effect 197 37 73 - 
Total Effect 149 41 69 - 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Source of cost data: Fiore & Collins, Successful Affiliate Marketing for Merchants, 2001
When word-of-mouth acquisition of customers is costless, their benefit per dollar is
infinite.  However,  some  firms  implement  strategies  to  actively  boost  word-of-mouth
generation by referral incentives, so the question arises: What is the maximum amount a firm
should  be  willing  to  pay  for  referrals.  Table  6  provides  an  answer  to  this  question  by
calculating the referral incentive that equates the CE contribution to that of other channels.
For instance, given that the total effect of word-of-mouth on the firm’s customer equity is
14.03, the firm could spend $149 per referral to obtain the same net benefit per dollar as the
one exhibited by a customer acquired through advertising21.
A Marketing Decision Support System for Optimal Resource Allocation
The previous cost-benefit analysis rank-ordered the different acquisition channels in
terms of benefit per dollar (see Table 6). This approach, while managerially insightful, has
three limitations. First, it assumes that, for each channel, the acquisition cost per customer
does not change with the number of customers acquired. This is equivalent to assuming that
the acquisition response function is linear with no intercept. Second, it does not address the
question of how much to spend on acquisition, nor does it reveal how the budget should be
allocated among the different acquisition channels.
In  this  section,  we  develop  a  marketing  decision  support  system  (MDSS)  to
determine the optimal acquisition budget and its allocation across the different acquisition
14
21 This reasoning assumes that customers acquired through incentivized WOM will behave in the same way as
those acquired through spontaneous WOM. channels. We have argued earlier that the objective should be to maximize customer equity,
which is different from maximizing “eyeballs” or customer counts. We will show that, if the
manager uses a different objective, the resulting allocation will be suboptimal. Our MDSS is
similar to that of Mantrala, Sinha, and Zoltners (1992), in that we use submarket (in our case,
channel)  acquisition  response  functions  to  derive  optimal  spending  and  allocation  across
submarkets. Assuming four acquisition channels k = {AD, DM, PR, WOM}, we define a
concave acquisition response function for each in the form22, 
(8) ck = αk + (Sk – αk)(1– exp(–βkxk))
where ck is the number of customers acquired, xk is the amount of money spent, Sk is the
maximum number of customers that can be acquired (saturation level), βk represents the rate
at which the number of customers approaches the saturation level, and αk is an intercept that
captures the number of customers acquired when no investment is made. 
These acquisition response functions can be parameterized for each channel using
decision calculus (see Blattberg and Deighton 1996 for a similar approach)23. The optimal
resource allocation finds the best investment for each acquisition channel           , given a
fixed budget B. It is also possible to determine the optimal acquisition budget  B* and then
derive             . The allocation problem can be expressed as
(9)
s.t. Σkxk ≤ B, xk ≥ 0, k = {AD, DM, PR, WOM}
where mk is the contribution margin for each customer acquired from a specific acquisition
channel, and B is the acquisition budget. We further assume that firms exhaust their entire
budget, that is Σxk = B.
Incorporating Differences in the Contribution to the Firm’s Profitability
Allocations  that  maximize  aggregate  acquisitions  (i.e.,  Σck)  do  not  necessarily
maximize aggregate profits, because customers differ in their customer equity contribution.
In contrast to Mantrala, Sinha, and Zoltners (1992), we incorporate the possibility of different
contribution  margins  mk for  the  different  submarkets  (i.e.,  acquisition  channels).  If  the
manager’s  objective  is  to  maximize  customer  equity,  mk  should  represent  the  expected
contribution of a new customer acquired through channel k as explained in previous sections.
15
22 We assume that there are no cross-effects of acquisition responses among channels. This assumption could be
relaxed by incorporating in each acquisition response function the effect that a certain spending in another
channel will have on the number of customers acquired in that specific channel. See Rangaswamy, Sinha,
and Zoltners (1990).
23 An estimation alternative to decision calculus would be using a statistical model on historical data. This may
present several challenges. First, it may prove difficult to collect data on some channels such as public
relations and word-of-mouth. Second, a sufficient number of data points with enough variability are required.
Third, the data generation process should be able to predict future behavior. If these requirements are not
met, decision calculus may be superior to statistical modeling. An example of a successful implementation of
decision calculus may be found in Lodish et al. (1988).
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   ( )  =    ( +(S - )(1-exp(- x )))- Π ∑ αα βNevertheless, some managers have a short-term objective and want to maximize profits in the
first period of the relationship. We specifically study three decision models, depending on
whether  the  manager  maximizes  short-term  profits  or  customer  equity,  and  whether  the
manager takes into account the heterogeneity in the marginal value of customers or not. We
show results for these three models and illustrate the effects of a short-term maximization
strategy on resource allocation:
Model 1. Same Value in the Short-Term across channels (SVST). In this case the
manager assumes that every acquired customer behaves similarly, therefore 
(10) – B
We explained in previous sections why this may not be a good assumption in most
scenarios.
Model 2. Different Value in the Short-Term across channels (DVST). As shown in
the empirical illustration, there is heterogeneity in customers’ login activity depending on
their acquisition channel. Hence, assuming that each acquisition channel brings the same
“average”  quality  of  customers  may  result  in  a  suboptimal  allocation.  In  this  model  we
account for differences among channels, but only in the short term. We propose to use the
contemporaneous impact multipliers from the IRF in the following way,
(11)
where φvk(0) is the contemporaneous impact multiplier of the direct effect of one customer
acquired  from  acquisition  channel  k on  the  firm’s  performance  V.  When  this  impact
multiplier cannot be expressed as profits, a function τ(γk) should be used. For example, in our
empirical illustration, we estimated the marginal contribution of an acquired customer on the
firm’s  login  activity,  and  we  showed  how  login  activity  relates  to  subsequent  customer
revenue generation. 
Model 3. Different Value in the Long-Term across channels (DVLT). Even though
model 2 is superior to model 1 in that it accounts for the differences in the contribution
margins across channels, it only incorporates differences in the contemporaneous effects. In
order to obtain long-run differences, we use contributions to the firm’s customer equity. For
that, we will use the long-term multipliers specified as λk in equation (5) such that
(12)
Therefore, mk in this model should be interpreted as the contribution of a person
acquired from acquisition channel k to the firm’s customer equity. That is, mk captures the
contribution of one customer to both current and future profits. 
16
Π() B  =  c m k
k ∑
mk  =    ( (0)) τφ vk 
mk    =   (   )   ≡ λτ γ k kFigure 4. Acquisition Response and Value generation Functions
Figure 6 graphically illustrates these three models. The optimal acquisition budget
and its allocation logically depend not only on the acquisition response function but also on
the  expected  monetary  value  that  corresponds  to  the  investment  in  each  channel.  This
expected  value  depends,  of  course,  on  the  number  of  customers  acquired  and  on  the
assumptions made about the expected contribution from each customer as well. For example,
some channels could be superior to others in the short term, but inferior in the long term. This
information,  captured  by  the  value  generating  function24,  together  with  the  acquisition
17
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where,
xk : acquisition spending for channel k
ck: number of customers acquired through channel k
vk,,s v k,l v k : firm value generated from customers acquired
through channel k, under models 1, 2, and 3, respectively.response functions, is sufficient to derive the optimal resource allocation. Since the objective
of the firm should be to maximize customer equity, we argue that model 3 (DVLT) should be
superior. 
Numerical Illustration
We provide an illustration using the results from our VAR model 25 on four different
acquisition channels. For the parameterization of the value generating functions we use the
contemporaneous  and  the  long-term  multipliers  as  reported  in  Table  6  and  we  derive
customer profitability based on equations (11) and (12). Therefore, the values γAD = 30.51,
γDM = 9.22, γPR = 16.58, γWOM = 14.03, φv,AD (0) = 9.07, φv,DM (0) = 3.98, φv,PR (0) = 6.21, and
φv,WOM (0) = 5.52 are used. For the short-term effect of model 1, we calculate the average of
the immediate multipliers, which is 6.2026. To calculate the acquisition response function for
each channel, we use equation (8)27. 
We  find  the  optimal  acquisition  budgets  ( B*)  for  each  of  these  models  to  be
$139,421, $125,959 and $387,296 respectively. There is a substantial difference between the
optimal acquisition budget for model 3 and those for models 1 and 2.  Therefore,  if  the
manager’s objective is to maximize short-term profits (using either SVST or DVST), she will
underspend on acquisition. Figure 8 shows the optimal acquisition budget and allocation of
the budget to each channel under different models.
18
24 We assume linearity in the value generating function. This means that the expected CE contribution of a
customer does not depend on the number of customers acquired from that particular channel. 
25 We are assuming that the past data generation process is valid for making predictions for the future. Under
some circumstances this data would not be valid to be used for prediction purposes. For example, if the life
cycle of the firm changes, or a new competitor enters into the market.  
26 Since τ(γk) is assumed common to all channels, it will not affect the optimal spending in each channel for a
specific budget. Nevertheless, it will affect the optimal acquisition budget. For the purpose of this illustration
we assume this function to be linear with no intercept and slope 20, which means that each login is worth 20
dollars.
27 Equation (8) has three parameters that are obtained as follows. First, for the saturation level and the intercept
we use the maximum and minimum number of registrations during these 70 weeks. We assume no intercept
for advertising (AD) and direct mail (DM) since these are channels with higher possibilities of marketing
intervention, whereas it is more likely to get customers without investing a penny from channels such as
word-of-mouth and public relations. Second, we pick the sensitivity parameter β so that marginal cost is
equal to the average cost of the channel (as reported in Table 4) in the middle of the spending range. Our
parameter values are: βAD = 0.0075, βDM = 0.0550, βPR = 0.0125, βWOM = 0.0210, αPR = 103, αWOM = 67, sAD =
550, sDM = 953, sPR = 1,104, sWOM = 1,746. Figure 5. Acquisition Allocation at the Optimal Budget
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Note: xk (B) is optinal acquisition spending in channel k under the budget constraint B. *
*
k x  (B)
*
k x  (B)
*
k x  (B)
*
k x  (B)In  many  firms,  the  acquisition  budget  is  set  by  senior  management,  and  the
marketing executive only has discretionary power over the allocation of that fixed budget. It
is therefore relevant to study the optimal allocation resulting from each of our three models.
Figure 10 shows the optimal allocation to each acquisition channel as a percentage of the
total budget for each of the three models. The allocations diverge substantially for small
values of the acquisition budget, and tend to converge to each other for high values. Indeed,
for high values of B, the firm is close to the saturation level of all channels, and therefore one
additional dollar spent on any channel has a small impact on profits. In contrast, for small
values of B any small change in the allocation across channels has a substantial impact on
profitability.  For  example,  if  the  firm  is  maximizing  the  contribution  to  customer  equity
(DVLT), a small budget will be spent mostly on generating word-of-mouth. However, if the
firm is maximizing short-term profits (either SVST or DVST), it will spend mainly on direct
marketing. Advertising is the channel that should receive the lowest allocation and firms only
start to invest in advertising for sufficiently high values of B. When firms maximize customer
equity, advertising spending begins when the budget approaches $150,000; but when firms
follow SVST, they only start to advertise when B is around $250,000.
In summary, we have developed an MDSS that can incorporate the long-run effects
of each acquisition channel along with the acquisition response functions. This model allows
us to determine both the optimal acquisition budget and the optimal resource allocation that
maximizes  customer  equity.  We  have  shown  that  myopically  following  a  short-term
maximization strategy will lead the manager both to underspend in acquisition and to allocate
a limited budget to channels that exhibit higher short-run returns that are lower in the long-
run.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has linked a statistical model capable of measuring the long-run impact
of customer acquisitions on customer equity to an MDSS that determines optimal acquisition
spending and its allocation across channels. To the best of our knowledge this is the first
attempt  of  its  kind.  The  VAR  model  allowed  us  to  measure  the  financial  impact  of  an
additional customer on the firm’s performance (V). Thus, we did not explicitly measure the
marketing effort (i.e., spending), but rather the result of that effort (i.e., an acquired customer)
and how that acquired customer increases the customer equity of the firm. We constructed a
metric  called  the  long-term  impact  multiplier,  which  generates  the  intrinsic  value  of  the
“typical” customer coming from a specific acquisition channel. This metric, based on impulse
response functions, not only captures the dynamic effects that a customer will exhibit in her
lifetime, but also the customer’s effect on other customers (e.g., generating word-of-mouth or
increasing usage level). As such, our metric captures the impact of an additional customer on
the customer equity of the firm.
The MDSS demonstrated the sub-optimality of acquisition-budget allocation rules
that maximize the short-term profitability of the company. We showed that, when the quality
of acquired customers differs across channels, the function that is maximized significantly
affects  the  percentage  of  budget  spent  on  each  channel.  Moreover,  we  showed  that  the
smaller the budget, the larger the differences among the three allocation models.
Our  measurement  and  optimization  methods  are  based  on  a  classification  of
customer  acquisition  channels  that  have  different  levels  of  intrusiveness  and  customer
contact. We expect these two criteria to have an impact on customers’ long-run behavior, and
20our empirical results confirm this expectation. Nevertheless, we do not test formal hypotheses
on these relationships, which we leave as an important area for future research.
Other limitations of our work offer areas for future exploration. First, more research
is needed to understand the dynamics of word-of-mouth generation. Estimating an acquisition
response function could be especially difficult for word-of-mouth for two reasons: (1) for
some firms it may be difficult to “incentivize” word-of-mouth and to know which is the best
way to do so (e.g., offering monetary incentives to the source or to the target of word-of-
mouth, or to both); (2) it may be difficult to predict customer reaction, especially when firms
have  never  encouraged  word-of-mouth  before  and  when  customers  behave  strategically.
Second, we do not consider the resource allocation between acquisition and retention. Our
MDSS could be extended to include both criteria simultaneously. We hope that this research
will  enhance  an  appreciation  for  the  differences  in  customers’  lifetime  value  and  its
implication for designing effective customer acquisition strategies. 
21Appendix A
The relationship between login activity and willingness to pay for a fee-based service
The  empirical  example  offers  an  unusual  opportunity  to  study  the  relationship
between customer usage levels of a free service and their willingness to pay when the service
becomes  fee-based.  During  the  70  weeks  of  our  observation  period,  customers  were  not
charged for the web-hosting service and did not know the firm intended to change that policy
later on. Two weeks after the end of our observation period, the firm announced by email
that, in two months’ time, users would either agree to pay subscription fees for different
service  levels,  or  face  the  termination  of  their  accounts.  We  obtained  data  on  which
customers declined the fee for service and which ones paid fees for at least one year after the
regime switch. We entertain and test the hypothesis that free-usage levels are an indication of
inherent customer utility for the service and therefore predict subsequent willingness to pay. 
The  hypothesis  is  tested  using  a  binary  logit  model  of  customer  choice,  using
individual data on login behavior and various demographic characteristics as independent
variables. Formally, we define 
1 if customer pays
PAY =
0 if customer abandons
The logit model includes the following covariates: 
(1) LOG20: total binary logins during the first 20 weeks of a relationship. Since
we  observe  customers  joining  the  firm  at  different  points  in  time,  we  accumulate  logins
during their first 20 weeks of the relationship1. This time period is sufficient to capture a
customer’s level of use and interest in the service. Furthermore, it allows us to study the login
behavior of a large number of customers, i.e., those who registered between week 1 and week
50 of the observation period. 
(2) WEEK: week in which the customer registered. This variable allows us to test
whether early adopters (customers who joined early) have a higher conversion probability
than late adopters. 
(3) RETAILER: 1 if retailer, 0 otherwise. Most of the firm’s customers are small
companies trying to advertise or sell through the Internet. Retailers are the most common
business type and constituted the main target of the firm, so a priori we expect the retailer
category to have higher conversion rates than others. 
(4) COUNTRY: 1 if US, 0 otherwise. Although most of the firm’s customers were
based in the US, some were international, so this dummy variable tests for a difference in 
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1 Using  total  logins  for  each  customer  during  the  70-week  period  would  increase  sample  size,  but  make
interpretation more difficult. Indeed, a sizeable percentage of registrants do not return to the site past the
initial week. In the full sample we could observe, for example, a customer registering in week 70 with an
average weekly login of 1, even though (s)he never returned to the site. Appendix (continued)
conversion  probability  between  these  nationalities.  Since  the  US  was  the  pioneer  in  the
commercialization of the Internet, we expect this indicator to have a positive impact. 
(5) EMP: number of employees. The firm expected their service to be most suited
to  the  needs  of  small  firms,  because  of  the  ease  of  use  and  simplicity  of  its  offering.
Therefore, we expect larger firms to have a smaller conversion probability.
We  first  estimate  a  binary  logit  model  on  the  total  sample  of  customers  who
registered between weeks 1 and 50 of the observation period. Of these free-service users,
only 1,030 (1.1%) chose to stay with the company after the fees were initiated. Thus, the
occurrence of PAY=1 in our sample is a rare event and the logit model logically predicts that
everyone  will  abandon  the  service,  which  results  in  a  98.9%  correct  classification  rate.
Nevertheless, all parameter estimates are found to be statistically significant, and our focal
construct LOG20 has a positive impact on the probability of paying (see Table A.1.). 
We also estimated the model with a choice-based sampling method that balances the
number  of  paying  customers  and  defectors  (see  Ben-Akiva  and  Lerman  1985).  This
technique  does  not  yield  consistent  maximum-likelihood  estimates  of  the  intercept.
Following Manski and Lerman (1977), we adjust the estimated intercepts for each alternative
by  substracting  from  the  exogeneous  maximum  likelihood  estimates  of  the  intercept  the
constant 1n(Sg/Pg), where Sg is the percentage of observations for alternative g in the sample,
and Pg is the percentage of observations for alternative g in the population2. 
The estimation results using the choice-based sample are reported in Table A1. The
model correctly classifies 90.8% of those who terminate and 86.5% of those who agree to
pay. The average predicted probability of retention for our choice-based sample is 0.475,
which  is  very  similar  to  the  observed  0.484.  Using  the  revised  intercept,  the  predicted
average retention probability for the population is 0.0107, which is also very close to the
observed value of 0.0111. 
The  results  support  our  hypothesis  of  a  significant  and  positive  effect  of  a
customer’s  login  activity  on  her  subsequent  willingness  to  pay.  Therefore,  acquisition
channels with a higher level of subsequent usage (login) activity will increase the subsequent
average  conversion  rates.  The  logit  results  are  also  consistent  with  our  demographic
hypotheses: customers who registered earlier, retailers, US-based firms and firms with fewer
employees are more likely to be retained than others. 
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2 Hence, for our particular estimation results, where we find an estimated intercept of –5.120, we have to
revise this intercept through the following steps. We have Sg = 1,030 / 2,130 = 0.4836, and Pg = 1,030 /
93,119 = 0.00111. Thus we have to subtract from the estimated intercept  1n(Sg/Pg). Similarly, we have  Sg =
1,100 / 2,130 = 0.5164, and Pg = 92,089 / 93,119 = 0.9889. Therefore, we should subtract from the intercept
of alternative 0 the constant 1n(Sg/Pg) = –0.6497. The estimated new constants will be -5.12 - 3.77 = -8.90
for alternative 1, and 0 – (-0.65) = 0.65 for alternative 0. Finally, since we want to keep alternative 0
normalized to be 0, we should add the constant  -0.65 to both alternatives. The resulting revised intercept will
be -9.55. For an example implementing this approach for the Multinomial Logit Model see Ben-Akiva and
Lerman (1985, p. 238).Appendix (continued)
Finally,  we  test  the  relative  predictive  strength  of  customer  usage  levels  by
estimating a logit model without the demographic covariates. This model correctly classifies
90.5% of the defectors and 84.5% of the future buyers. These numbers are very close to the
percentages correctly classified when other predictor variables are included in the model. In
fact, the demographic variables only add 0.3 and 2.1 percentage points for correctly classified
defectors and paying customers, respectively. Additionally, a model with only demographic
variables as covariates classifies correctly 75.9% of the defectors and only 59.0% of the
future buyers. Thus, it is login activity, and not customer demographics, that is the leading
indicator of subsequent willingness to pay. 
Table A.1. Estimation Results Binary Logit Model
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total Population  Choice-Based Sample 
(N=93,119) (N=2,130)
estimate s.e. estimate s.e.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
intercept -9.713 (0.579)** -5.120 (0.730)**
intercept (revised) -9.547
log20 0.281 (0.006)** 0.324 (0.013)**
week -0.013 (0.002)** -0.020 (0.005)**
bus 0.763 (0.069)** 0.807 (0.152)**
country 3.440 (0.565)** 3.207 (0.690)**
emp -0.107 (0.051)*  -0.179 (0.089)* 
-2 Log Likelihood 7,194 1,287
Cox & Snell R Square 0.043 0.542
Nagelkerke R Square 0.379 0.723
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
* Significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level
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